



Power to the People

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BALLOT MEASURES IN
ADVANCING EARLY CARE AND EDUCATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Executive Summary is excerpted from the National Women's Law Center's full and much more extensive report of the same title. Copies of that report, as well as additional copies of this Executive Summary, can be ordered or downloaded from the Center's website, www.nwlc.org.



Access to affordable, high-quality child care is critical to women’s ability to participate and be productive in the paid labor force and essential to their children’s development and well-being. Nonetheless, high-quality child care is too often unaffordable or simply unavailable, and the public investment needed to address these problems has been insufficient. Thus, advocates are always on the lookout for successful ideas and strategies that can preserve and expand hard-won investments in early care and education and after-school (ECE/AS) programs.

Increasingly, ECE/AS advocates from Seattle, Washington to the state of Florida have taken their case directly to the public—in the form of ballot initiatives and referendums. But are ballot measures an effective way to advance the ECE/AS agenda? And if so, how can advocates maximize their chances for success? This report analyzes ECE/AS ballot measures as a group to assess whether some proposals are more successful on the ballot than others, evaluate the accomplishments of the winners and their success in increasing ECE/AS investments over the long term, weigh how these accomplishments stack up against the costs of achieving them, and compare some of the advantages and disadvantages of ballot measures with legislation. It concludes that ballot campaigns can be an effective strategy for ECE/AS advocates and provides lessons from past ballot campaigns that can enhance the chances that a ballot measure will be successful, both on election day and beyond.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report examines several ballot measures aimed at improving the quality, affordability, and availability of programs that provide children and youth with care and enrichment for those hours when they are not in the care of parents and not in school. The measures analyzed include both initiatives and referendums, and statewide as well as local measures. While not exhaustive, the analysis encompasses most of the measures that have appeared on the ballot through 2003 in which increased investment in ECE/AS programs was either central to the measure’s purpose or at least a significant component of a more comprehensive proposal. Thirteen separate ballot measures (referred to collectively as the “core-analysis” measures) and eighteen very similar proposals in several Florida counties (referred to collectively as the Florida Children’s Services Councils, or CSC, referendums) met these criteria. The ballot measures studied are summarized in the chart at the end of this Executive Summary.

This analysis draws on a combination of legal research and research into public records, a review of a representative sampling of academic and other literature, and consultations with numerous experts and advocates. Because much of the story behind ballot campaigns is not found in publications, central to the research were thirty-two in-depth telephone interviews conducted

during 2003 and 2004 of individuals who were the main proponents, key players, and influential advocates involved in eight of the ballot campaigns studied.

Since the universe of ballot measures on ECE/AS programs is relatively small and complete information on all of the ballot measures studied was not always obtainable, some conclusions are supported more by examples than by a more complete quantitative analyses. Still, because the study encompasses much of the ECE/AS ballot measure universe, it is possible to detect patterns and reach some conclusions about ballot campaigns as a worthwhile advocacy strategy and ways to maximize the chances for waging successful ballot campaigns.

PREVALENCE AND GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT BALLOT MEASURES

There are two general types of ballot measures that offer citizens the opportunity to take a direct role in lawmaking: initiatives and referendums. Initiatives are measures proposed by members of the general public, whereas referendums are measures passed by a legislative body that are submitted to the voters for approval or rejection. Both types of ballot measures can be used to enact statutes or constitutional amendments. In general, measures that amend a state constitution or a local charter cannot be amended or repealed except through another ballot measure, whereas in most cases lawmakers retain the power to modify a statute created through initiative or referendum.

Ballot measures are not a strategy that is available everywhere, however. Only twenty-four states permit their citizens to propose statewide ballot initiatives, although thousands of cities and counties permit local ballot initiatives. Only twenty-three states permit their state legislatures to place proposed statutes on the ballot, although all states but one not only permit but require constitutional amendments passed by the legislature to be submitted to the voters for approval in a referendum.

Despite the fact that ballot measures have been in existence in the United States for about 100 years and are now a regular feature of the electoral landscape, “direct democracy” through ballot initiatives is not without controversy. Many political observers have expressed concerns about the process, particularly about undue influence by moneyed interests, the soundness of the public policies that are produced without the input and deliberation provided by the legislative process, and the cumulative effects of budgeting by ballot. The legislative process, however, shares some of the same or similar pitfalls. Legislatures can be dominated by wealthy special interests, and the legislative process offers no guarantees that the “right” priorities will be funded. Whether, in the end, ballot initiatives make a beneficial or detrimental contribution to democracy, ECE/AS advocates have already compiled a significant record and are increasingly considering and deploying this strategy, making this an opportune time to evaluate the effectiveness of ballot measures in furthering the ECE/AS agenda.

THE EFFECT OF ECE/AS BALLOT MEASURES' CONTENT ON SUCCESS AT POLLS

Ballot measures on ECE/AS issues have enjoyed a fairly high rate of success. Nine of the thirteen core-analysis measures—roughly 67%—triumphed on election day, as did eight of the eighteen (44%) Florida CSC referendums. Based on election results, the type of ECE/AS policy or program proposed does not seem to have driven a measure's success or failure at the polls. In contrast, the type of financing mechanism proposed does seem to have had some effect on a measure's success.

A wide range of ECE/AS policies proved they could be popular with the public, with no particular ECE/AS policy a sure winner or a sure loser. For example, measures that contained proposals to expand pre-kindergarten won in three jurisdictions (Florida, Colorado, and Tennessee) but lost in two others (Alabama and Seattle). Measures containing expansions of after-school programs won in four jurisdictions (Seattle, Tennessee, California and Portland), lost in one (Denver, twice), and both won and lost in Florida. And measures that included improved access to, or quality in, child care won in four jurisdictions (Aspen, San Francisco, California and Portland), lost in one (Denver, twice), and both won and lost in two jurisdictions (Seattle and Florida).

Moreover, looking at ways of presenting ECE/AS policies—either by themselves or as part of a package of children's services or education reforms—shows mixed results as well: both ways of presenting ECE/AS measures had some successes and some failures. Measures containing only one or more ECE and/or AS policies won in California (Prop. 49 initiative) and Florida (Universal Pre-kindergarten (UPK) initiative), but lost in Denver (2001 initiative) and Seattle (Latte Tax initiative). Measures in which ECE and/or AS policies were packaged with other, non-ECE/AS programs won in Seattle (Families and Education (F&E) Levy referendum), Aspen, San Francisco, California (Prop. 10 initiative), Colorado, Tennessee, and Portland, but these “package deals” lost in Denver (2000 referendum) and Alabama. In the case of the Florida CSC referendums, the *very same proposal* to improve a range of children's services won about half the time and lost the other half. Thus, the way in which the policy proposals were packaged also does not seem to have been particularly determinative of their success. Although more proposals that combined ECE and/or AS with other proposals won (seven of nine of the core-analysis measures and eight of the eighteen Florida CSC referendums) than proposals that were restricted to ECE and/or AS issues (two of the four core-analysis measures), the much smaller size of the latter group, and the lack of issue-specific exit poll data to determine whether ECE/AS issues or the other issues in the package drove the vote, make firm conclusions perilous.

By contrast, the way in which a ballot measure proposes to fund the proposed ECE/AS policy or program does seem to have had some effect on a measure's success at the polls. Although a range of financing schemes was successful at the ballot box, some had more difficulty than others. A small but uniformly successful group of proposals that earmarked funds from existing revenues, with protections for existing funding of the same or related programs, suggests there is probably some advantage in being able to tell the public that EAS/AS goals can be accomplished with no new taxes and no diminution in support for other similar programs. Three of the thirteen core-analysis measures contained this type of earmark (the San Francisco Children's Fund, Colorado Pre-K-12, and California Prop. 49 initiatives), and all were approved by the voters. There may or may not

be an advantage to including no funding mechanism—the one measure that left financing to the state legislature to determine, the Florida UPK initiative, was also successful at the polls.

However, winning voter support for raising new revenues is also possible; ballot measures that increased broadly shared sales or property taxes, taxed specific products, and established lotteries were successful about half the time. Eight of the eighteen Florida CSC referendums and three of the five core-analysis measures that proposed increased sales or property taxes were approved by the voters (Seattle F&E Levy referendum, Aspen Day Care referendum, and Portland Children’s Investment Fund referendum), but the two Kids’ Tax measures in Denver and ten of the Florida CSC referendums were rejected. The Seattle Latte Tax initiative, which proposed taxing espresso drinks, lost, and the California Prop. 10 initiative, which proposed taxing tobacco products, just barely squeaked by, in part because the taxation of specific products contained in these measures targeted identifiable business interests that had the incentive and resources to mount effective opposition. The two measures that proposed raising non-tax revenues from state lotteries also generated controversy, with the opposition grounded in objections to gambling revenue as a financing mechanism. One (Tennessee Lottery referendum) passed, but the other (Alabama Lottery referendum) did not.

All of the ballot measures studied contained one or more other financing-related provisions—sunsets, segregated accounts, and various anti-supplantation provisions—that may have contributed to the success of the winning measures but were no guarantee of success.

Six of the thirteen core-analysis measures (Seattle F&E Levy referendum, Aspen Day Care referendum, San Francisco Children’s Fund initiative, Portland Children’s Investment Fund referendum, and two Denver Kids’ Tax measures) and one of the Florida CSC referendums contained sunset provisions, which cause the measures to expire unless renewed by the voters. Such provisions, especially when they accompanied proposals to raise taxes, may have contributed to victory at the polls in some instances by reassuring voters they would have a chance to evaluate the results before agreeing to their continuation. Five of these seven measures (all but the two Denver measures) won at the polls and three of them (Seattle, Aspen, and San Francisco) have reached their sunset dates (Seattle more than once) and been renewed by the voters.

Six of the thirteen core-analysis measures (San Francisco Children’s Fund initiative, California Prop. 10 initiative, Alabama Lottery referendum, Colorado Pre-K-12 initiative, Portland Children’s Investment Fund referendum, and Seattle Latte Tax initiative) contained a requirement to place any revenues raised in a fund that is segregated from the rest of the treasury, which may have helped garner support for the measure by reassuring voters that the funding will be spent as intended and as promised. Four of these six (all but the Alabama and Seattle measures) were successful at the polls; the San Francisco measure was also renewed by the voters at its sunset date. All of the Florida CSC referendums contained segregated fund requirements as well; eight of these won and ten lost.

Nine of the thirteen core-analysis measures (Seattle F&E Levy referendum, San Francisco Children’s Fund initiative, California Prop. 10 initiative, Alabama Lottery referendum, Colorado Pre-K initiative, Tennessee Lottery referendum, California Prop. 49 initiative, Florida UPK initiative, and Seattle Latte Tax initiative) and one of the Florida CSC referendums contained provisions prohibiting lawmakers from using new funds to replace their existing expenditures

for ECE/AS programs, to help make sure any newly allocated funds actually added to ECE/AS investment rather than supplanted existing spending. Eight of these ten measures won on election day.

In sum, a fairly wide range of ECE/AS issues and ways of packaging them were represented and most were successful, suggesting that the type of ECE/AS policy put forward and the way it was presented were not particularly decisive to the outcome on election day. In contrast, the financing mechanism contained in the ballot proposal appears to have had an impact on the outcome. Finally, the inclusion of structural devices such as sunset provisions, segregated funds and various anti-supplantation provisions may have increased the odds of winning for several measures but was not a guarantee of success.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECE/AS BALLOT MEASURES IN ACCOMPLISHING THEIR GOALS

Winning on election day is a good start, but it is not the whole story. To assess whether ballot measures constitute an effective strategy for winning ECE/AS improvements, it is important to determine what they have accomplished and whether they are achieving their goals. All of the ECE/AS ballot measures studied sought to increase the total amount of public funds invested in ECE/AS programs and services in order to increase the quantity and/or improve the quality of ECE/AS programs. And most of the winning measures have been successful in achieving their objectives.

The fourteen ballot measures that both won at the polls and have been fully implemented—six of the thirteen core-analysis measures and eight of the eighteen Florida CSC referendums—have delivered increased funding for ECE/AS programs, producing hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in new funding annually. Both the twelve measures containing dedicated tax increases (Seattle F&E Levy referendum, Aspen Day Care referendum, California Prop. 10 initiative, Portland Children’s Investment Fund referendum, and eight Florida CSC referendums) and the two measures containing earmarks from existing funds (San Francisco Children’s Fund initiative and Colorado Pre-K-12 initiative) have been effective in producing increased investments for ECE/AS programs.

Not only have the ballot measures that have been fully implemented been successful in increasing ECE/AS investments, they have also been successful in protecting and preserving their increased funding streams over time—the more recent ones for only short periods of time but the older ones for fifteen years or more. As described above, most of these measures contained structural devices such as segregated funds and/or anti-supplantation prohibitions to protect existing funding for the same or similar programs and to protect their new funding streams from being diverted for other purposes. But the extent to which these devices have been responsible for the measure’s enduring success is unclear. For example, two measures (Seattle F&E Levy referendum and Aspen Day Care referendum) managed to hold on to their ECE/AS funding over fifteen years with few or no structural safeguards, indicating that a political commitment to the goals of the ballot measure—and a reluctance to contravene the will of the voters—may also be responsible for securing a stable funding stream for ECE/AS programs.

The two ballot measures that won at the polls but have not been fully implemented (California Prop. 49 initiative and Tennessee Lottery referendum) have, not surprisingly, had less impact. The California measure has not yet generated any increased investment in AS programs, though it has helped restore a cut and prevented any further decrease in investment, and the Tennessee measure has just begun to increase investment in ECE/AS programs, albeit modestly. Both of these measures show promise for greater increases in the future, but they also contain design contingencies and/or ambiguities that may hinder their capacity to fully achieve their goals.

Finally, the impact of the Florida UPK initiative, which won at the polls but only begins to take effect in the 2005–06 school year, is unclear at this writing. Although it promises to deliver a substantially increased investment in pre-kindergarten, it does not seem likely that its implementation will fully meet its primary objective of ensuring a high-quality, universal pre-kindergarten program.

Besides generating (or, by losing, failing to generate) new funding for ECE/AS programs or bringing about specific policy changes, ballot campaigns have had other effects, both positive and negative. Advocates interviewed who were key supporters of eight ballot measures (California Prop. 10 initiative, Colorado Pre-K-12 initiative, two Denver Kids' Tax measures, California Prop. 49 initiative, Florida UPK initiative, Portland Children's Investment Fund referendum, and Seattle Latte Tax initiative) reported that the measures that passed had some positive impact on generating additional funding and policy gains, as well as strengthening partnerships and coalitions. They also reported that even some of the ballot measures that lost produced some of these positive side effects. However, there is other evidence that some of the defeated campaigns not only failed to accomplish their objectives, but also may have set back the ECE/AS cause in their jurisdictions.

THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ECE/AS BALLOT MEASURES

With few exceptions, the advances that ballot measures have produced have not come without substantial investments of both money and time. Based on estimates for the nine measures for which monetary cost and time estimates were available (San Francisco Children's Fund initiative, California Prop. 10 initiative, Colorado Pre-K-12 initiative, 2001 Denver Kids' Tax initiative, Tennessee Lottery referendum, California Prop. 49 initiative, Florida UPK initiative, Portland Children's Investment Fund initiative, and Seattle Latte Tax initiative), local ballot campaigns raised and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and statewide campaigns more often millions of dollars. They also demanded the "24/7" schedule typical of a political campaign, which meant large investments of unpaid labor over an extended period of time, usually one to two years at a minimum.

Although the costs in both money and time were sizeable, the four ECE/AS ballot measures that won at the polls, have been fully implemented, and for which monetary and time estimates are known, have more than paid off, producing very high returns for those investments. As previously described, they have generated substantial funding increases that have endured, in several cases over long periods of time.

Even the two measures that have been only partially implemented have established their cost-effectiveness. As previously described, one of these measures has just begun to increase ECE/AS investment and the other, although it has not yet generated any increased investment, has helped restore a cut and prevented any further decrease in investment.

A seventh measure has not yet been implemented, and, as previously described, although it will generate substantial new investment, it may not fully live up to its promise, decreasing its cost-effectiveness. The two remaining measures for which cost and time estimates were obtained illustrate, as might be expected, that it certainly is not cost-effective to lose on election day.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECE/AS BALLOT STRATEGIES COMPARED TO LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES

Ballot campaigns can be a productive and cost-effective means of advancing the ECE/AS agenda, but in evaluating whether to mount such an effort, advocates must consider whether a ballot campaign is more effective than other available advocacy strategies. Traditionally, the primary strategy used by ECE/AS advocates to achieve their policy agenda has been aimed at those who make the laws and their implementing regulations. Thus, it makes sense to weigh the merits of what advocates have been able to accomplish through ECE/AS ballot campaigns—and at what strategic risk—against what advocates typically accomplish, and at what risk, by legislative approaches. On balance, ballot campaigns can be a sound alternative to legislative efforts.

The key advantages ballot campaigns have over legislative campaigns for advocates are all related to getting things done that are not getting done in the legislature. Proponents of several ECE/AS ballot initiatives said they turned to the ballot because they had become impatient with the breadth and/or the pace of legislative action on their issues and believed that an initiative would provide them the means to accomplish the substantive policy changes they wanted, and to accomplish them sooner. They were able to exercise much greater control over the content—to frame the proposal exactly as they wished—and get an up-or-down vote on it, without the political compromises and incrementalism usually inherent in the legislative process. As a result, advocates were able to propose much bolder changes—in degree and in kind—than they realistically would have proposed or been able to obtain in legislation. And winning ballot measures—especially initiatives—have features that legislation typically lacks that seem to contribute to making them more durable, including the fact that they have been expressly approved by the voters.

But ballot measures have drawbacks as well. They are in many ways higher-stakes endeavors than legislation. It takes one lawmaker to introduce a bill, compared to the thousands of signatures needed to qualify for the ballot. Moreover, there are a limited number of “targets” (decisionmakers) to communicate with and persuade in a legislative campaign, and they can often be persuaded by a small cadre of advocates with a representative demonstration of grass roots support. In contrast, ballot campaigns require communications with many more “targets” (voters), and grass roots support cannot be merely symbolic or representative—it must be broad and it will be tested on election day. Moreover, compared to legislation, losing a ballot measure is usually higher-profile and carries more risk of political setback. There are also legitimate concerns about

the wisdom of lawmaking by ballot and its cumulative effects. Ballot initiatives in particular limit the legislature's ability to weigh a proposal against competing needs and priorities, and may not produce sound public policy. And the fact that ballot measures may be legally or politically harder to change may make them harder than legislation to correct if they produce unintended effects.

In the end, however, although ballot measures require a significant investment of resources and are not without risk, they are often attractive alternatives to legislation for advocates seeking significant ECE/AS advances.

INGREDIENTS FOR A WINNING BALLOT CAMPAIGN

More often than not, the ECE/AS advocates who have mounted ballot campaigns have met with success at the polls. However, there have also been disappointments. Based on the analysis in this report and the interviews with key supporters of eight of the ECE/AS ballot measures, both the wins and the losses are instructive, and some lessons emerge for how to maximize a campaign's chances for electoral success.

The key ingredients for mounting a successful campaign include effective assessment of legal considerations, a political-campaign approach that includes hiring professionals and raising significant sums of money, a well-developed and popular proposal, good timing, and an effective mobilization of supporters that includes early coalition-building and well-designed and well-implemented communications and grass roots organizing strategies.

- **Legal Considerations.** Every phase and aspect of ballot campaigns—from determining what ballot options are available, to drafting a measure that will withstand challenge and navigating the qualification requirements, to fundraising and otherwise assessing the degree to which an advocate's organization can and should be involved in a ballot campaign—raise legal issues that advocates must consider and address. As an initial matter, ECE/AS advocates must assess whether and what types of ballot measures are permitted in their jurisdiction and the legal requirements for initiating and advancing the desired measure. In addition, and especially if advocates work for a non-profit, charitable organization, there may be organizational legal issues to consider, such as whether a high level of involvement in a ballot campaign runs afoul of any state or federal requirements.
- **A Political-Campaign Approach.** Ballot campaigns are no place for amateurs. Advocates may be adept at navigating their legislature, but a ballot campaign is a political campaign, and it must be waged as such. That means hiring the requisite professionals early on, especially political professionals, and it means raising much more money than ECE/AS advocates may be accustomed to raising for other advocacy campaigns. Campaign professionals play an important role in developing overall campaign strategy and managing the campaign, including by directing communications, fundraising, and voter-turnout activities. To raise the kind of money needed to hire professionals, gather the signatures needed to place the measure on the ballot, and wage an effective campaign,

there is a particular need for “heavy hitters” who will contribute substantially themselves and raise funds from other large contributors.

- **A Well-Developed and Popular Proposal.** In light of the significant investment and effort entailed in waging a ballot campaign, advocates should make full use of the opportunity to pursue the policies and programs that they really want. They should draft the ballot measure with both voter support and implementation in mind, heeding the lessons of the particular campaigns studied in this report, so that victory is both attainable and meaningful. They should use early polling and, if possible, focus groups to test the measure’s appeal and to craft messages to support it. The proposed measure needs to garner a very high level of initial public support, preferably at 65% or higher, because once the measure is unveiled, that support can be eroded by criticism or opposition. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not at all clear that a prerequisite for public support is prior public awareness of ECE or AS issues—the ballot campaign itself may provide the means of expanding public awareness.
- **Good Timing.** Assuming the proposal is well-developed and has broad support, an essential next part of the calculation is deciding the best time for a vote. This calculus involves strategically combining what is learned about particular voters’ support for, or opposition to, the proposal with what is known about voting patterns and election-cycle options. Factors to be weighed include how many and which types of voters turn out for what types of elections and what the likely impact will be if there are other issues on the ballot at the same time. The goal is to identify likely supporters and assess other demographics that can help predict which election cycle is likely to attract the most supporters and least opponents and try to time the proposal’s appearance on the ballot accordingly.
- **Effective Mobilization of Supporters.** A successful campaign must engage in smart coalition-building from the very start—beginning with developing and drafting the ballot proposal. The process used from the onset can have a large effect not only on the content of the measure but also the ways in which the internal and external politics of the campaign play out, including the likelihood that a broad group of individuals and organizations will actively support and actually campaign for the measure. In addition to seeking the input and buy-in of supporters early on, it is crucial to anticipate and take steps to win over or neutralize potential opponents. The ECE/AS ballot campaigns that were successful at the ballot box also often had an effective, well-connected “champion” leading the charge, someone who was passionate about the issue, was a credible spokesperson, and had business or political connections that could be parlayed into concrete expressions of support. At the same time, these campaigns worked to make their efforts as bipartisan or nonpartisan as possible. Finally, effective mass communication efforts and grass roots organizing were essential to the success of most ballot campaigns, although in some instances a strong communications effort compensated for weak grass roots organizing, and vice versa.

CONCLUSION

The costs of spearheading a ballot campaign in both time and money are sizeable, and losing at the polls can have repercussions beyond election day. However, ECE/AS ballot measures have a good record of prevailing at the polls, and when they do, they can be remarkably effective both in generating increased public investments in ECE/AS programs and protecting newly allocated funds from being raided or used simply to supplant previous spending. The time and money required to win a ballot measure, stacked up against the money and stability that can result from passage, reveal that ballot measures can be not only a cost-effective but highly profitable approach, and thus a potentially valuable tool in the strategic arsenal of ECE/AS advocates. For advocates who undertake such an effort, there is much to learn from those who have been through ballot campaigns. Heeding these lessons will significantly enhance the possibility that an ECE/AS ballot proposal is successful, both on election day and beyond.



ECE/AS BALLOT MEASURES STUDIED*

Name & Jurisdiction	Type of Measure	Election Date	Outcome	Brief Description	Funding Mechanism	Implementation Status
Florida Children's Services Councils (CSCs)	Statutory referendums (except Miami-Dade was a charter amendment referendum)	Oldest in 1946 (Pinellas), most recent in 2002 (Miami-Dade, with 2008 sunset)	8 referendums passed; 10 referendums failed	Fund, as part of wide range of children's services, child care-related, school-readiness, and/or after-school programs to varying degrees.	Half-mill property tax levy, except Pinellas and Palm Beach County, which sought from the voters and won increase to one mill.	Fully implemented. Vary in amount of funding and allocations; e.g., Broward spent 37% of its \$25.2 million in 2003 on "out-of-school" programs and 15% on child care and school readiness programs.
Seattle Families & Education Levy	Statutory referendum	1990 with 7-year sunset (renewed in 1997; and again in 2004)	Passed 56%–44% (1997: passed 61%–39%. 2004: passed 62%–38%)	Funds early childhood development, including child care, preschool, and out-of-school activities, as well as school-based services. (2004 renewal places greater emphasis on ECE and includes career wage ladder program for ECE teachers from defeated 2003 Seattle Latte Tax initiative).	Property tax levy of nearly a quarter-mill, up to a maximum of \$69.2 million over 7 years. (1997 renewal maximum was also \$69 million but 2004 renewal increased maximum to nearly \$117 million over 7 years. No specific millage rate was specified in the two renewal measures.)	Fully implemented. In 2003, about \$1.5 million was allocated for child care programs, including subsidies for low-income families, teacher training, and school-age care, and about \$1.3 million was allocated for after-school-related activities.
Aspen Affordable Housing/Day Care	Statutory referendum	1990 with 10-year sunset (renewed in 1999)	Passed 53%–47% (1999: passed 66%–34%)	Funds "day care" services such as financial aid for parents, grants for infant and toddler care, several quality improvements, in-home care start-up help, and resource and referral.	Sales tax increase of .45%.	Fully implemented. Generated over \$10 million for ECE in 1994–2004.
San Francisco Children's Fund	City charter amendment initiative	1991 with 10-year sunset (renewed in 2000 with 15-year sunset)	Passed 54%–46% (2000: passed 73%–27%)	Funds broad range of children's services, including ECE/AS programs, with required allocation of 25% for child care for first 4 years.	Set-aside of 2.5¢/\$100 of property taxes for Children's Fund, and "base amount" of spending on children's services required from general funds. (Renewal by referendum increased set-aside to 3¢/\$100 and strengthened baseline budget.)	Fully implemented. No breakdown of expenditures on ECE/AS programs is available, but in FY 2002–2003, of the \$85.5 million in combined Children's Fund/Baseline Budget funds, about \$16 million was budgeted for ECE programs (amount for AS programs unavailable).
California Proposition 10	Statutory initiative	1998	Passed 50.5%–49.5%	Funds wide range of early childhood development programs, with 3% of state commission's 20% share of total funds reserved for ECE. Key ECE components include quality improvements (education, training for child care providers) and increased access to child care services.	Dedicated 50¢-per-pack tobacco tax. 20% of revenues allocated to state commission and 80% allocated to county commissions.	Fully implemented. No breakdown of expenditures on ECE programs is available, but in FY 2001–2002, the state commission appears to have spent \$19 million on ECE-related programs, and in FY 2002–2003, county commissions spent more than \$11.2 million on ECE programs.
Alabama Lottery	Constitutional amendment referendum	1999	Failed 54%–46%	Proposed to first "fully fund" college scholarships, then to "fully fund" voluntary pre-kindergarten.	Proceeds from state lottery.	N/A
Colorado Pre-K-12	Constitutional amendment initiative	2000	Passed 53%–46%	Increases annual per-pupil spending for grades pre-kindergarten–12 by inflation+1% for 10 years (and at inflation rate thereafter), and increases general fund appropriations by at least 5%/year, with escape hatch. Also permits use of earmarked funds to expand preschool availability.	Set-aside of state revenue equal to .33% of federal taxable income in the state plus general fund appropriation.	Fully implemented. Resulted in base per-pupil spending increases for preschool of inflation+1% annually through FY 2005–2006. Also resulted in the addition of 1,000 preschool slots over two years for FY 2001–2002 and FY 2002–2003, temporarily suspended for next two years, but restored and increased by 1,310 slots in FY 2005–2006. All increases paid for in part out of increase in general education fund appropriation by at least 5% in every year except FY 2002–2003.

Name & Jurisdiction	Type of Measure	Election Date	Outcome	Brief Description	Funding Mechanism	Implementation Status
<i>2000 Denver Kids' Tax</i>	Statutory referendum	2000	Failed 56%–44%	Proposed to fund health services, early education, and after-school programs.	Sales tax increase of .2% for 10 years.	N/A
<i>2001 Denver Kids' Tax</i>	Statutory initiative	2001	Failed 62%–38%	Proposed to fund services for "unattended children" (defined in ordinance but not on ballot as child care and after-school programs).	Sales tax increase of .2% for 10 years.	N/A
Tennessee Lottery	Constitutional amendment referendum	2002	Passed 57%–43%	First funds post-secondary school scholarships; any excess net proceeds go to capital outlays for education facilities and early learning and after-school programs.	Proceeds from state lottery.	Partially implemented. Lottery launched Jan., 2004 and generated \$296 million in net proceeds and small additional amount in unclaimed prize monies by FY 2004–2005; no appropriation of these proceeds was made for ECE/AS until FY 2005–2006, when a maximum of \$25 million was allocated for pre-kindergarten and \$4 million for after-school programs.
<i>California Proposition 49</i>	Statutory initiative	2002	Passed 57%–43%	Establishes funding floor for after-school programs; requires funding of up to \$550 million subject to specified growth in general, non-education fund appropriations.	Set-aside from general funds other than those already earmarked for education.	Partially implemented. Funding floor took effect in FY 2004–2005, but as of mid-2005 funding increases not yet triggered by sufficient growth in general fund appropriations.
<i>Florida Universal Pre-Kindergarten (UPK)</i>	Constitutional amendment initiative	2002	Passed 59%–41%	Requires state to provide free, voluntary, high-quality pre-kindergarten to all 4-year-olds.	To be determined by legislature, but must not use funds allocated as of 1/1/02 for child or adult education, health care, or development programs.	Takes effect beginning in 2005–2006 school year. State legislature passed implementing legislation at the end of 2004 and appropriated \$378.1 million for FY 2005–2006.
<i>Portland Children's Investment Fund</i>	Statutory referendum	2002 with 5-year sunset	Passed 53%–47%	Funds "cost-effective, proven" programs for child care and early education, after-school and mentoring, and child abuse prevention.	Property tax increase of \$.4026/\$1,000 in property value.	Fully implemented. Generated \$8.7 million in available program funds in FY 2003–2004, of which \$1.6 million was allocated for child care and \$2.2 million for after-school programs in first year.
<i>Seattle Latte Tax</i>	Statutory initiative	2003	Failed 31%–69%	Proposed to fund several programs to improve child care quality and help reduce its cost, and expand pre-kindergarten.	10¢-per-espreso drink tax.	N/A

*Measures in italics are those on which in-depth interviews with key supporters of the measure were conducted.

The eight wins include Miami-Dade County, in which the referendum passed in 2002; the ten losses include Pasco County, in which the CSC referendum failed twice, and Miami-Dade County, in which the referendum failed once (in 1988).



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